Second Bio-Responsibility Policy Lecture
From Lab Safety to Bio-Responsibility: Building the Human Infrastructure for Safe and Secure Science
The lecture provided an overview of how institutions can build practical, risk-based systems to identify, assess, and manage lab biorisks while continuing to enable scientific progress. Particular attention will be given to the human infrastructure required to make such systems work. Regulations, oversight committees, and laboratory facilities are essential, but their effectiveness ultimately depends on trained professionals who can translate policy into practice, advise researchers, recognise emerging risks, and strengthen institutional preparedness.
Antony Schwartz
Director of Biological Safety, Duke University
About the speaker
Antony Schwartz, PhD, CBSP, is Director of Biological Safety at Duke University, where he serves as Biological Safety Officer, Responsible Official for the Select Agent Program, and Institutional Contact for Dual Use Research. A microbiologist and graduate of the NIH National Biosafety and Biocontainment Training Program (NBBTP), he later served as Responsible Official for the NIH Select Agent Program. His work spans institutional biorisk management, high-containment laboratories, biosecurity governance, dual-use research oversight, training, and international capacity building. He is active in ABSA International and has published and spoken on strengthening biosafety and biosecurity while enabling responsible scientific research and innovation.
The Inaugural Bio-Responsibility Policy Lecture
The Importance of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in the Evolving Bio-threat Landscape
This presentation provided an overview of the Biological Weapons Convention and current efforts to strengthen and institutionalize it against the background of an evolving bio-threat landscape. It also described the opportunities available for diverse stakeholders to meaningfully engage and contribute in the strengthening and implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention.
Daniel Feakes
Chief, Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit (ISU)
United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Geneva
About the speaker
Daniel is the Chief of the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) of the Biological Weapons Convention within the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs in Geneva. He manages the activities of the ISU and the implementation of other activities in support of the BWC. He has served as the Secretary to all formal BWC meetings since late 2014, including the Eighth and Ninth BWC Review Conferences in 2016 and 2022, respectively.
Daniel has experience both in the field of multilateral disarmament and in working with international organizations. From 2009 to 2014, he worked in the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in The Hague. At the OPCW, Daniel oversaw education and outreach activities, was involved in the preparation and conduct of the Third Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and worked closely with partners in other international organizations, the scientific community, and civil society.
Prior to joining the OPCW, Daniel spent 12 years as a Research Fellow with the Harvard Sussex Program on Chemical and Biological Weapons at the University of Sussex, where he worked on chemical and biological weapons issues and published widely on these topics.